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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DONALD 0. MARTINSON, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL C0~1ISSION 
OF UTAH, W-M INSURANCE 
AGENCY, INC., and STATE 
INSURANCE FUND, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 16345 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is an application by plaintiff Donald 0. Martinson to 
determine his entitlement to workmen's compensation benefits 
arising out of a November 21, 1976 motor vehicular collision. 
DISPOSITION IN THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
After a hearing on liability only, Honorable Keith E. Sohrn, 
Administrative Law Judge, entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Order denying plaintiff's entitlement and dismissing 
his petition. (R. 199-206). Thereafter, the Commission denied 
plaintiff's Motion for Review. (R. 209-10). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff Martinson seeks reversal of the Administrative 
Law Judge's Order and the Commission's denial, and direction of 
an Order establishing his entitlement to such workmen's compensa-
tion benefits as are established following review by a medical 
panel. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A summary of undisputed facts follows: 
At all times here pertinent, Martinson--in the liabi-
lity insurance business since 194 9--was a vice president, direc-
tor and employee, paid on a commission basis, of W-M Insurance 
Agency, Inc., Salt Lake City. He earned $48,173.20 in 1976. ~ 
was primarily engaged in production, for which he received 60%--
and W-M 40%--of commissions upon premiums generated and renewed. 
(R. 2, 19-20, 26,30). 
W-M asked Martinson to spend mornings in the office to 
attend to details on his accounts. Afternoons, he generally was 
out calling an old business and creating new. Also, he occasion· 
ally worked on business accounts on weekends. Himself a residen: 
of Salt Lake City, Martinson had no territorial limits on insur-
ance solicitation; and, in fact had a customer as far away as 
Mesa, Arizona. (R. 19-21). 
One such customer--for which Martinson made his sole 
out-of-town trip in November, 1976--was Kimball Art Center, Park 
City. An unsalaried Center sponsor and director was Bob Hilliaro: 
President of Arthur G. Rubin and Company, a Los Angeles insuranc< 
agency. Martinson during 1966-69 had worked for Williams and was 
a friend, so the latter, who placed the Center insurance, did so 
with W-M through Martinson, resulting, of course, in the standar: 
40%-60% premium split. (R. 20-22, 41-42, 46, 63). 
The policy issued was a Fireman's Fund M X P or port-
folio policy. It covered both the Center's construction phase 
and the art exhibition thereafter. (R. 20-21A, 60). 
The Center's opening for exhibition occurred on Satu~ 
-2-
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November 20, 1976. For the event, a large number of art ob-
jects--such as paintings, sculptures and crafts--had been assem-
bled on the site. (R. 21). 
Earlier in the week, Williams had called Martinson from 
Los Angeles and requested the latter to come to Park City to make 
a complete inspection of the display in order to assure that the 
insurance coverage was adequate. Also, he invited Martinson on 
the 20th to be an overnight guest of his wife and him at his Park 
City condominium. The Williams arrived in Park City the 18th or 
19th. (R. 20-211 241 411 51-52) • 
Although Martinson does not pretend to appraise art 
values, it is usual for an agent personally to examine large dis-
plays at insured museums. (R. 41, 49, 51). W-M's president was 
aware of Martinsou's trip to Park City for that purpose, did not 
object, and--in Martinson's characterization--"if I had said I 
wasn't going, he would have gone right through the ceiling." 
(R. 38-39). 
On the 20th, Martinson drove to Park City alone, taking 
his Kimball Art Center insurance file, a change of clothes and a 
kit to stay the night. (R. 41, 51-52). He arrived in Park City 
between noon and two p.m., and met Williams. (R. 21A). They 
looked over the Center items, which involved getting a final list 
of everything that had come in from all over the country before 
display. (R. 21). Although the staff had recorded almost, but 
not everything, such records had not previously been communicated 
to Martinson. Also the manager was busy, because of the many 
persons in attendance. (R. 40). Therefore, the compilation was 
not completed until Sunday, the 21st. 
-3-
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the 20th, and likely the 21st. (R. 22-23). On the 21st, the 
two went over the records from late in the morning until 4:30 or 
4:45p.m., at which time they reconciled a $55,000 insurance 
shortage. (R. 24). 
On Sunday, the 21st, Williams further gave Martinson a 
lead on possible Utah insurance business with National Lead. 
(R. 47-48). After he returned to work following the collision, 
Martinson pursued, without avail, that lead. (R. 53-54) . 
The $55,000 deficiency having been confirmed, Martinson 
called from Williams' condominium to Donald 0. Hurst at the lat-
ter's Salt Lake residence. Hurst was resident vice president and 
manager of Firemen's Fund (which had issued the M X P or portfo-
lio policy). They arranged for a binder for the $55,000 addition· 
al coverage, effective as of (if not before) the call. W-M earnec 
a premium for such additional coverage. (R. 24-25, 39-40, 52, 51, 
61-62). 
Business completed, Martinson left the Williams' condo-
minium at 5:00 or 5:30 p.m. to drive back to Salt Lake. (R. 26). 
As he approached the Parley's Summit incline, he was driving his 
car at a speed of 60 to 70 mph, slowing to 50 to 60 mph at the 
crest of the incline. It was going into dusk. The weather was 
clear. The road was dry. There was no traffic. (R. 31-32). 
As Martinson traversed the crest, he saw directly aheac 
of him--30 to 60 seconds distant--a truck in his lane, going roue: 
more slowly than he. He did not know how stable his automobile 
would be were he to execute a quick turn; he feared he would roL 
He determined it would be safer to go into the back of the truci 
which he did. Although he thinks he applied the brakes, the 
-4-
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investigating officer was of the opinion he did not. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
(R. 26, 32). 
Martinson's blood sample, taken at 8:36p.m., November 
21, contained .18% alcohol by weight. (R. 7, 63-64, 177-78). 
Martinson and Williams had consumed spirituous beverage during 
their afternoon conference, but Martinson cannot recall the 
quantity although he characterized it as "social drinking," and 
"over a long period of time." (R. 53, 55, 69). He had nothing 
to drink after leaving Williams and until the collision. 
(R. 69-70). 
The principals did not consider Martinson to be alco-
holically impaired as he left to come home. Hurst, who has 
known Martinson socially for 40 years and who has seen him drink, 
said, "I had no idea that he had had a drink, or was partying. 
As far as I was concerned, he was calling on business, and I 
knew that he was attending the opening of that Kimball Art Center." 
(R. 62). Martinson himself had "a very clear recollection of 
leaving the condominium, driving down the freeway, and noticing 
that it was a beautiful day. I didn't feel like I was drunk, or 
that I couldn't handle a car." (R. 55). Williams, after the 
fact, told Martinson, "'Had we thought,' (that is he and his 
wife) 'that you were too intoxicated to drive, we would have 
asked you to stay over.'" (R. 33). 
In the course of his business, approximately 30% of 
Martinson's customer and potential customer contacts involve 
drinking to varying degrees. (R. 57, 70). W-M Insurance had 
no hard and fast rules about tippling while producing. Martinson 
did suggest to a fellow employee that it would be best if he 
-5-
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would abstain at lunch. The employee agreed. It was pointed 
out that such drinking was something that was inhibiting his 
work. (R. 35-36). Previously, Martinson had counseled with a 
physician regarding a depressive reaction to imbibing. He had 
received no prior drunk driving citations. (R. 34-35). 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
As a result of the collision, Martinson suffered exten· 
sive injuries, missed a great deal of work, has undergone repea· 
ted and prolonged hospital and outpatient treatment, and has 
incurred extensive obligations. (R. 5-6, 8-10, 27-30, 71-176), 
As previously noted, no medical panel evaluation was had before 
the Commission. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ABSENT INTOXICATION, PLAINTIFF'S COLLISION AROSE OUT OF OR IN Tffi 
COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT. 
Clearly Martinson's .18% blood alcohol count, as well 
as the drinking activity productive thereof, was central to the 
Administrative Law Judge's rationale and decision--both of which 
were adopted, without comment, by the Commission. The imbibing 
is mentioned, usually in multiples, on no less than four of the 
five full pages of the Findings, Conclusions and Order. (R. 20~ 
202-04). It is a fair conclusion that--had everything else beer 
exactly as it was, but non-alcoholic instead of spirituous bever 
ages consumed--Martinson would have been held entitled to comper· 
sation. 
The undisputed facts dictate such a result. 
First, the nature of the trip. Plaintiff was a valus· 
ble employee to W-M. In'76, for instance, its income, basedUf· 
-6-
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Martinson's production, was 40% of commissions he generated, or 
$32,115.47 (Martinson's 60% being $48,173.20). 
Far from being tied to a desk or to explicit instruc-
tions, Martinson's sales activities took him from the office on 
afternoons and occasionally on weekends. They took him as far 
away as Mesa, Arizona. 
So, it was both natural and proper, when a preexisting 
policy holder--Williams for Kimball Art Center--asked him to come 
to Park City to inspect and inventory exhibits in order to update 
the coverage under that very policy, that Martinson would do so. 
Not only had Martinson and W-M reaped financial returns from the 
original policy; they would do so again directly from any in-
crease in coverage, and indirectly from the good will attendant 
to assiduous servicing of insurance accounts. 
Therefore, while W-M may not explicitly have directed 
Martinson's trip, W-M naturally did not object thereto, and 
"would have gone right through the ceiling" had Martinson refused 
to go. 
Second, the necessity of the trip. Martinson's Park 
City activities produced a binder, effective November 21 for the 
$55,000 additional Center exhibits. 
The Administrative Law Judge is confused as to the 
nature of an insurance binder. He recites that, when Martinson 
called the Fireman Fund's Hurst, he "asked for additional cover-
age." (R. 200, emphasis supplied). 
To the contrary, Martinson obtained additional coverage, 
effective immediately. Said Hurst, "Well the binder was placed 
as of that minute, so far as I was concerned." 
-7-
(R. 62A). 
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The fact that the binder was oral gives rise to no 
distinction. Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth Edition), p. 213 
defines the term: 
BINDER. The memorandum of an agreement for 
insurance, intended to give temporary pro-
tection pending investigation of the risk 
and issuance of a formal policy. Seiderman 
v. Herman Perla Inc., 268 N.Y. 188, 197 N.E. 
190, 191. 
A verbal contract of insurance in praesenti, 
of which the insurance agent makes a memoran-
dum, temporary in its nature, Norwich Union 
Fire Ins. Society v. Dalton, Tex. Civ.App., 
175 s.w. 459, 460; thus constituting a short 
method of issuing a temporary policy to con-
tinue until execution of the formal one, 
Sherri v. National Surety Co., 243 N.Y. 266, 
153 N.E. 70, 71. Carew, Shaw & Bernasconi v. 
General Casualty Co. of America, 189 Wash. 
329, 65 P.2d 689, 695. 
Assume, for a moment, that Martinson had not gone to 
Park City, that he and Williams had not assembled, inspected and 
compiled records, and that a binder in consequence had not been 
placed. Assume, further, that a casualty had destroyed the addi· 
tional $55,000 in art objects on the night of November 21-22. Ir. 
that event, Kimball Art Center would have absorbed the additional 
loss and W-M most likely would have lost a customer alienated by 
the inattentiveness of W-M's services. 
Likewise, it was a business necessity for Martinson tc 
work on the 21st, for all records were not available until then. 
It follows that Martinson's Park City activities were 
compelled by business considerations, authorized in the characte: 
of insurance enterprises, and distinctly necessary. In every 
way, they met the test of Ford Motor Company v. Industrial C~ 
sion, 64 Utah 425, 231 Pac 432 (1924). Martinson's promotion o: 
W-M' s business was not remote. It was real, and directly facil! 
-a-
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tated W-M's financial interests. 
POINT II 
UNDER THE UTAH STATUTE, INTOXICATION REDUCES, BUT DOES NOT ELI-
MINATE, COMPENSATION. 
Workmen's Compensation laws vary from state to state. 
In consequence, the impact of intoxication in one jurisdiction 
can be quite different than that in another, 81 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Workmen's Compensation Sec. 234, pp. 886-87. 
Effective July 1, 1921, the Utah result of intoxica-
tion has been governed by Laws of Utah 1921, Chap. 67. As now 
codified 35-1-14, UCA 1953, it reads: 
Penalty for failure to use safety device.--
Where injury is caused by the willful failure 
of the employee to use safety devices where 
provided by the employer, or from the employ-
ee's willful failure to obey any order or 
reasonable rule adopted by the employer for 
the safety of the employee, or from the intoxi-
cation of the employee, compensation provided 
for herein shall be reduced fifteen per cent, 
except in case of injury resulting in death. 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
The legislature having so mandated, decisions from 
states without a comparable statute are more misleading than 
helpful. Conversely, those from jurisdictions which have adop-
ted a similar scheme have great persuasive weight. Two such 
entities are Wisconsin (15% reduction) and Colorado (50% reduc-
tion). 
In Gimbel Bros. v. Industrial Commission, 229 Wis. 
296, 282 N.W. 78 (1938), a delivery truck driver dropped off 
merchandise at a customer's tavern. He then partook of the 
tavern's alcoholic liquid wares until he became staggering, vom-
iting drunk. Nonetheless, the driver continued his deliveries 
-9-
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and, while so occupied, lost control of the truck, and collided 
with a lamp post. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held the facts 
did not preclude an 85% recovery. It said at 282 N.W. 80: 
If it had been the intention of 
the legislature to penalize employees 
who violated any law either willfully 
or otherwise while in the course of 
their employment, they would have so 
provided. As the Compensation Act now 
provides, the only penalty visited on 
employees where injury results from 
their intoxication is a reduction of 
15% from the amount they would otherwise 
be entitled to. 
In Electric Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Industrial Connnis· 
sion, 154 Colo. 491, 391 P.2d 677 (1964), a General Electric Com· 
pany technician was in a one-car accident returning from an out-
of-town trip. He had a .195% alcohol blood level. The Colorado 
Supreme Court held the facts did not preclude a 50% recovery. Iti 
said at 391 P2d 679: 
The only effect that intoxication could 
have in this case would be to reduce his 
benefits by 50%; it had nothing to do with 
the question as to whether the employee sus-
tained injuries arising out of and in the 
course of his employment. 
Undoubtedly the evidence justified a finding that--at 
the time of his accident--Martinson was intoxicated. His .18% 
blood alcohol level was .08% higher than the criminal level, 
41-6-44.2 UCA 1953. It was .10% higher than the present--and 
• 03% higher than the pre-1967--presumptive level, 41-6-44, 1953. 
Therefore--although there was contrary evidence--the fact find-
er's determination of drunkenness cannot here be attacked. 
What can, and should be, assaulted is the Administra-
tive Law Judge's and the Commission's cavalier disregard of 
-10-
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35-1-14. Although cited to both (R. 195, 211), neither dealt 
with it. Here, it is controlling. 
Morley v. Industrial Commission, 23 U.2d 212, 459 P2d 
212 (1969), cited by the Administrative Law Judge, is not--nor 
does it pretend to be--a 35-1-14 decision. In that matter, un-
like this, facts in contravention of the claimant's recital both 
were elicited and compelling. There, unlike here, the facts dem-
onstrated an all-inclusive private purpose. 
At one point, the Administrative Law Judge opined, 
"We can easily infer that his (Martinson's) boss did not encour-
age him to drink with his clientel but would and probably did 
discourage said actions." The inference is at odds with the 
total evidence. (R. 35-36, 57, 70). But--even if the inference 
is accepted--it would constitute nothing more than a "reasonable 
rule for the safety of the employee," which also is specified by 
35-1-14 and which could be no more than a ground additional to 
intoxication for a 15% reduction. 
The Legislature, not the Commission, draws Utah's 
Workmen's Compensation policy. The Commission cannot properly 
ignor the mandate of 35-1-14. 
CONCLUSION 
The trip from which Martinson was returning at the 
time of his collision was a necessary business one. A finding 
of intoxication will reduce, but not preclude, compensation. 
The case should be remanded to the Commission for reference to a 
medical panel, and for such further proceedings as are appro-
priate. 
-11-
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Respectfully submitted, 
Kefit nearer ' 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
Martinson 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I certify that I personally delivered two copies of 
the foregoing to: 
M. David Eckersley, Esq. 
Black and Moore 
Attorney for Defendants 
Suite 500, Ten West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Office of the Attorney General 
Room 236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
DATED this 30th day of April, 1979. 
Kent Shearer ~. 
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